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There are two salient features of many writings on human capital 
in developing countries. First, a fraction of the educated workforce mi-
grates to developed countries. Since educated workers are one of the 
scarcest resources in developing countries, it has been argued that the 
migration of educated workers is a “brain drain” for the developing 
countries.1 Second, in a number of developing countries, a large frac-
tion of the educated workforce is unemployed. For example, in their in-
fluential development economics textbook, Economics of Development, 
Gillis et al. (1996) allude to the Sri Lankan experience as a striking ex-
ample, noting that half of the country’s new university graduates were 
unemployed in the 1970s.2 The phenomenon of educated unemploy-
ment in those developing countries contrasts sharply with the pattern 
of unemployment in developed countries. In the latter, the unemploy-
ment rate and educational attainment are strongly negatively correlated 
(Ashenfelter and Ham 1979).
However, while there has been extensive research on the brain 
drain,3 the issue of “educated unemployment” has attracted little atten-
tion in the economics literature, despite references to its importance in 
development economics textbooks. A notable exception is an article by 
Bhagwati and Hamada (1974). In a fixed-wage framework, Bhagwati 
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and Hamada argue that a high foreign wage can increase the fixed wage 
rate of the educated in the home country by affecting people’s psychol-
ogy and that, in turn, the higher fixed wage increases unemployment.4 
However, since educated unemployment is not a serious problem in 
all of the developing countries, Bhagwati and Hamada could not ex-
plain why a high foreign wage affects the psychology of people in some 
countries but not in others.
This chapter provides an alternative model of educated unemploy-
ment. In the model developed here, educated unemployment is caused 
by the prospect of international migration, that is, by the possibility 
of a brain drain. In a simple job-search framework we show that an 
individual’s reservation wage in the labor market of the home country 
increases with the probability of working abroad. Consequently, work-
ers who fail to line up employment abroad are less likely to immedi-
ately immerse themselves in work in their home country. Instead, they 
enter unemployment in order to engage in a repeated attempt to secure 
foreign employment. Thus, we provide a new explanation for the phe-
nomenon of educated unemployment observed in developing countries. 
Our theoretical analysis provides a basis and a rationale for rigorous 
empirical tests of this important phenomenon—tests that, to the best 
of our knowledge, are absent in the received literature. Moreover, our 
main argument that international migration and educated unemploy-
ment are closely linked seems to be consistent with considerable anec-
dotal evidence and policy-related research.5
We integrate the educated unemployment–international migration 
perspective with the recent literature on the “beneficial brain drain,”6 
which contends that compared to a closed economy, an economy open 
to migration differs not only in the opportunities that workers face but 
also in the structure of the incentives that they confront: higher prospec-
tive returns to human capital in a foreign country impinge favorably 
on human capital formation decisions at home. The analysis contained 
in this chapter shows that a developing country may end up with more 
educated workers despite the brain drain and educated unemploy-
ment. In other words, the average level of human capital in the country 
may well be higher under migration than in the absence of migration. 
This higher level can play a positive role in determining long-run fu-
ture output growth, the present-day gloom of educated unemployment 
notwithstanding.
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The next two sections of this chapter, “Migration and educated un-
employment” and “The choice of acquiring higher education,” set up 
the basic analytical framework and present a model of educated unem-
ployment. The fourth section presents an analysis demonstrating that 
the prospect of international migration can lead to a “brain gain” de-
spite brain drain and the possibility of being unemployed after acquir-
ing a higher level of education. The final section offers conclusions and 
complementary reflections.
MIGRATION AND EDUCATED UNEMPLOYMENT
Consider a world that consists of two countries: home, H, and for-
eign, F. Country H is developing and is poorer than country F, which 
is developed. Because of a policy of selective migration by F, only ed-
ucated individuals (say, university graduates) of H have a chance of 
working in, hence migrating to, F.
In this section we analyze the behavior of the home country’s edu-
cated individuals. In the next section we incorporate into the model the 
cost of education and we analyze the decision to acquire education.
For our purposes, we assume that everyone in H is educated. The 
decision-making process of an educated individual is illustrated by Fig-
ure 3.1. According to this model, an educated individual makes deci-
sions in (at most) three stages:7
The first stage. When an individual graduates from a university in 
H, the individual participates in a lottery draw that results in probable 
work in F. If the individual obtains a winning ticket, his income will be 
wf. The probability of being selected to work in F is p.
The second stage. (Note that there is no second stage for individu-
als who win the draw.) An individual who graduates and fails to secure 
work in F faces the following choices: to work or to wait for another 
draw. Waiting for another draw frees up time to search for a job in F. 
Alternatively, if the individual were to work, little time (and energy) 
would be available for preparing applications and, in addition, the indi-
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vidual’s academic qualifications could depreciate, thereby lowering the 
probability of being picked up for work in F.8
The assumption that individuals choose unemployment while wait-
ing for another draw of going abroad is particularly consistent with the 
job-search theory. In fact, the assumption that the probability of finding 
a (new) job is higher when an individual does not hold a job, but in-
stead concentrates on searching for a job, is at the heart of the literature 
on job search and the natural rate of unemployment (Mortensen 1986; 
Acemoglu and Shimer 1999; Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright 2005). The 
rationale underlying this assumption is that searching for a job requires 
time and effort. The received job-search theory refers to domestic mar-
kets. It is reasonable to assume that finding a job in a foreign labor 
market requires even more time and effort.9 
For simplicity’s sake, we assume that if the individual works, he 
cannot participate in any additional draw, so his probability of ending 
up working in F is zero. If the individual does not work and awaits an-
other draw, his chances of going abroad are p'.
The third stage. (Note that the third stage only applies to those who 
waited for another draw in the second stage.) If an individual wins this 
draw, he will go abroad. Otherwise, he will work at home, receiving the 
home country’s mean wage rate.
The job offers in the second and third stage follow an independently 
identical distribution. The cumulative distribution function of the wage 
offer, w, is F(w). We assume that F(w) is differentiable. We also assume 
that
 w∈[wl , wh] 
and that the density function,  
dF(w) ≡ F'(w) , 
  dw
is strictly positive in its domain, that is,            
F'(w) > 0  ∀w∈[wl,wh] .
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                  _
(3.1)  (1 − p')w + p'wf ,
     _    
where w is the mean wage in H, namely 






In the second stage, if the individual receives a wage offer w at H, 
he will accept it if and only if
          1    _(3.2) w > 1 + r [(1 − p')w + p'w
f] ,
        
where r is the individual’s discount rate.
We define
           1     _(3.3) wc ≡ 1 + r [(1 − p')w + p'w
f] .
In this case, the individual will accept the wage offer at H if and only if 
w > wc. Thus, wc is the individual’s reservation wage at H.
Further simplifying, we assume that
           1    _(3.4) wl ≥  1 + r w ;
educated unemployment will not exist in the absence of an additional 
possibility of migration (that is, when p' = 0).10
Then, the fraction of the educated who are unemployed11 is
(3.5) u ≡ P (w ≤ wc) = F(wc) .
Clearly,
(3.6)  du = du  dw
c
  dp'   dw
c dp'   _
                  = F' w
f − w  .    1 + r      
˜
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Note that the assumption that F is developed and H is developing natu-
rally implies that w f > w. Since F' > 0 ,
(3.7) du  > 0 .
 dp'
In addition, we note that
      1     _       _wc ≡  1 + r 
[w + p' (w f − w)]
 
and that
      du   _
  p'
(3.8) d(w f − w) = F' 1 + r  > 0 .
In summary, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 1: 1) The unemployment rate of university graduates 
in a developing country will increase as the probability of migration 
rises. 2) The unemployment rate of university graduates in a developing 
country will increase as the wage gap between the developed country 
and the developing country increases.
Proposition 1 implies that in a developing country, educated un-
employment is caused by the prospect of international migration, that 
is, by the possibility of a brain drain. The greater the probability of be-
ing selected for work in the foreign country and the greater the wage 
gap between the foreign country and the developing country, the more 
serious the educated unemployment problem. The intuition underlying 
the proposition is straightforward. From Equation (3.3) we can see that 
wc increases with p' and with wf, and that it decreases with w, which 
means that the individual’s reservation wage in the home labor market 
increases with the probability of working abroad and with the interna-
tional wage gap. Consequently, the unemployment rate will increase as 
the reservation wage rises.
Moreover, we have assumed for the sake of simplicity that only 
educated individuals (say, university graduates) of the home country 
have a chance of working in, hence migrating to, the foreign country. If 
we modify this assumption slightly, so that a better-educated individual 
in a developing country faces a higher probability of working abroad, 
then by similar logic to Proposition 1, we will obtain the result that the 
unemployment rate is higher for individuals with higher education.
_
_
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THE CHOICE OF ACQUIRING HIGHER EDUCATION
The benefit that education without migration confers is simply H’s 
mean wage rate of educated workers, w. When migration is a possibil-
ity, the expected payoff from the three stages described in the preceding 
section is          
_       
wh 
         p'wf +(1 − p')w(3.9) V ≡ pwf + (1 + p) ∫wc wdF(w) + F(wc) 1 + r                 
wh
     = pwf + (1 − p)  ∫wc wF'(w)dw + F(wc)wc .
Clearly,
          dV                    dwc(3.10)      dwf = p + (1 − p) −F'(wc)wc + F'(wc)wc + F(wc) dwf         p'
 = p + (1 − p)F(wc) 1 + r > 0 .
Let us assume that
(3.11)   p' = p(1 + α) ,
where α is a fixed parameter. To ensure that 0 < p' < 1, we assume that 
                  1   −1 < α < p  − 1 . 
Then,
       dV              wh   dp = w
f − ∫wc wdF(w) + F(wc)wc
_                (wf − w)(1 + α)(3.12)              + (1 − p) −F'(wc)wc + F'(wc)wc + F(wc)1 + r       
wh
                  _
 = wf − ∫wc wdF(w) + F(wc)wc+ (1 − p)F(wc) (w
f − w)(1 + α)
            1 + r
We further assume that
(3.13)   wf > wh .
_
.
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To rule out the unreasonable possibility that all the educated are unem-
ployed, we assume that
(3.14)   wc < wh . 
It follows that 
          
wh
  ∫wc wdF(w) + F(w
c)wc
                   wh
    ≤ ∫wc w
hdF(w) + F(wc)wh
               
wh
    = wh∫wc dF(w) + F(w
c)wh
 = wh[F(wh) − F(wc)] + F(wc)wh
 =  wh .
Therefore,
                        
wh
(3.15)   wf > ∫wc wdF(w) + F(wc)wc,
and it then follows from Equation (3.12) that
             dV(3.16)   dp > 0 ,
that is, the benefit of acquiring a university education in H increases as 
the probability of migration rises.
We next incorporate the cost of acquiring education. Our idea is 
that individuals differ in their abilities and familial background, hence 
in their cost of acquiring education. We normalize the size of the (pre-
migration) population of H to be Lebesgue measure 1. Suppose that an 
individual’s cost of obtaining education, c, follows the uniform distri-
bution c∈[0,Ω] .
We assume that the (lifetime) income of an uneducated individual 
is constant, and we denote it by Φ. Then, recalling the assumption that 
only individuals with university degrees have any chance of migrating, 
we see that an individual will choose to acquire a university education 
if and only if 
˜
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(3.17) V − c ≥ Φ . 
Let us define 
(3.18) c* = V − Φ . 
It follows that an individual will obtain a university education if and 
only if his cost of education maintains 
c ≤ c* .
Since c follows a uniform distribution and the population size of the 
economy is of Lebesgue measure 1, both the proportion and the number 
of educated individuals are given by
               c*(3.19) Ω  .  
From Equation (3.18) we get
(3.20) d(c*/Ω) =  1 dV  > 0 ,                  dp         Ω dp 
where the inequality sign in Equation (3.20) follows from Equation 
(3.16). We thus have the following proposition:
Proposition 2: The number of individuals undertaking university 
education will increase as the probability of migration rises.
This proposition implies that while the prospect of migration causes 
the unemployment rate of educated individuals in the home country to 
increase (Equation [3.7]), it also induces more individuals to acquire 
education (Equation [3.20]). The end result may be an increase in the 
number of unemployed university graduates. Thus, Propositions 1 and 
2 provide an explanation for the phenomenon of educated unemploy-
ment by linking it to migration.
˜
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A BRAIN DRAIN VERSUS A BRAIN GAIN
In this section, akin to Stark, Helmenstein, and Prskawetz (1997, 
1998), we seek to examine whether the prospect of migration can re-
sult in a larger number of educated individuals in the home country. 
Since in our model only educated individuals have a positive probabil-
ity of migration, it follows that if the prospect of migration results in a 
larger number of educated individuals in the home country, then it will 
a fortiori result in a higher fraction of educated individuals in the home 
country.
The following proposition shows that the brain gain caused by the 
prospect of migration may be larger than the loss from the brain drain.
Proposition 3: There exists a positive level of p at which the number 
of university graduates remaining in the developing country is higher 
than the number of university graduates in the developing country when 
p = 0 , for any given α , if wf > (3 + α)w .
Proof: We first note that c* is a function of V and hence of p, so we 
define it as
(3.21) c* ≡ c(p) .
Then, under the migration prospect, the number of university graduates 
remaining in the developing country is
(3.22) c(p) − p 
c(p) + (1 − p) p' c(p)F(wc)  Ω            Ω                       Ω




 c(p)(1 − p)[1 − p(1 + α)F(wc)] 
−
 c(0) ,  Ω                               Ω                          Ω
     K(p)so that   Ω    
is the difference between the number of educated individu-
_
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als in the home country when p > 0, and the number of educated indi-
viduals in the home country when p = 0.
Since 
K(p) ≡ c(p)(1 − p)[1 − p(1 + α)F(wc)] − c(0) ,
we know that 
K(0) = 0 
and that
K'(p) = c'(p)(1 − p) [1 − p(1 + α)F(wc)]            
_                       
− 1 − p(1 + α)F(wc) + (1 − p)(1 + α)F(wc) + pF'(wc) 
(wf − w)(1 + α)
c(p)                 1 + r
We seek to show that K'(0) > 0 which, by the continuity of K(p), 
would imply that K(p) > K(0) in the small (positive) neighborhood of 
p = 0. Note that
K'(0) = c'(0) − [1 + (1 + α)F(wc)]c(0) .
When p = 0, we know from the assumptions in Equations (3.4) and 
(3.11) that educated unemployment will not exist in the absence of an 
additional possibility of migration, which implies that wc = wl. Then, 
from the last line of Equation (3.12) and from the consideration that 
F(wl) = 0, we get            
_
dV                     wh                             (wf − w)(1 + α)
dp │p=0 = w
f − ∫wc wdF(w) + F(wc)wc+ (1 − p)F(wc)         1 + r 
                         
wh                             (wf − w)(1 + α)       = wf − ∫wl wdF(w) + F(wl)wl+ (1 − p)F(wl)          1 + r     
(3.23) = wf − w .
Also, from the equality in Equation (3.20) , we know that 
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Therefore,
                
_ dc(p) | p=0 = c'(0) = dV  | p=0 = wf − w .   dp      dp
          _
When p = 0, V = w . Hence, from (3.18) and the definition c* = c(p) , 
we get 
(3.24) c(0)  = V − Ф
        = w − Φ .
Thus, K'(0) > 0 if and only if
         _         _
(3.25) wf − w −[1 + (1 + α)F(wc)](w − Φ) > 0 .
Since
1 + (1 + α)F(wc) < 2 + α ,
Equation (3.25) will be satisfied if
        _        _
wf − w − (2 + α)(w − Φ) > 0 ,
that is, if
                                  _
(3.26) wf  > (3 + α)w − (2 + α)Φ .
                        _
And since Φ > 0, it follows that when wf > (3 + α)w, Equation (3.26) 
will be satisfied, in which case we will have the result that 
K'(0) > 0. 
Hence, by the continuity of K(p), it must be that K(p) > K(0) in the small 
(positive) neighborhood of p = 0. ■
Proposition 3 shows that a developing country may end up with 
more university graduates despite the brain drain of university gradu-
ates. If we consider that there is a reduction of the population in the 
wake of migration, the proposition also implies that the developing 
_
46   Stark and Fan
country may end up with a higher fraction of educated individuals, de-
spite the brain drain of university graduates.
Combining Propositions 1 and 3 yields the following corollary:
Corollary 1: A positive level of educated unemployment in a de-
veloping country coexists with a larger number of university graduates 
in the country than the number of university graduates in the country 
under no educated unemployment if wf > (3 + α)w.
Since there are fewer individuals in the country under feasible mi-
gration, and since there are more educated individuals in the country 
under feasible migration, it must follow that the average level of human 
capital in the country is higher under migration than in the absence of 
migration. This higher level can play a critical role in determining long-
run output growth, an issue to which we will turn in a future work.
CONCLUSION
Since the late 1960s, the development economics literature has 
pointed to a stark connection between migration and unemployment: 
workers change their location, but not their productive attributes, in 
response to an expected wage at destination that is higher than their 
wage at origin, only to end up unemployed (Todaro 1969). We propose 
a different connection between migration and unemployment wherein 
workers move into unemployment at origin in response to an expected 
wage at destination, and workers improve their productive attributes. 
While the flight of human capital and the unemployment of human cap-
ital occupied the center stage of development economics at about the 
same time (the 1970s), analysts and policymakers did not make a causal 
connection between the two phenomena except for noting that unem-
ployment induced a desire to migrate. Our analysis considers a link: in a 
simple job-search framework, we show that an individual’s reservation 
wage in the home labor market increases with the probability of work-
ing abroad. Thus, our model implies that such unemployment would 
be smaller in the absence of the migration possibility. Furthermore, we 
integrate our model into the recent literature of beneficial brain drain. 
The analysis shows that a developing country may end up with more 
_
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educated individuals despite the brain drain and educated unemploy-
ment. Our theoretical analysis provides a basis and a rationale for rig-
orous empirical tests of the link between international migration and 
educated unemployment, which are absent in the received literature. 
Such empirical endeavors will constitute an interesting topic for future 
research.
Notes
We are grateful to Gordon Hanson and to an anonymous referee for helpful advice, 
enlightening comments, and constructive suggestions. Financial support from the Hum-
boldt Foundation, the Sohmen Foundation, and the International Centre for the Study of 
East Asian Development is gratefully acknowledged.
 1. For a systematic review of this argument see Bhagwati and Wilson (1989).
 2. Also, Mathew (1997) reports that in urban Kerala, India, in 1983, the unemploy-
ment rate of university graduates was 11.34 percent for males and 25.69 percent 
for females, which is much higher than the unemployment rate of those who 
had no education (3.52 percent for males and 1.52 percent for females) and than 
the unemployment rate of those who had up to primary education (6.73 per-
cent for males and 8.43 percent for females). More recently, Bourdarbat (2004) 
shows that in 2000, the unemployment rate of university graduates in Morocco 
was about four times that of individuals who had acquired less than six years of 
schooling.
  3. The topic of the brain drain is also regularly taken up in the informed press (see 
the short overview in Stark [2004]).
  4. For example, Bhagwati and Hamada (1974, p. 20) state, “The presence of in-
ternational income-inequality implies that, for the educated elite which is better 
informed about the developed world, and more integrated therewith regarding 
the notions of a ‘good life’ and related values, the salary levels demanded and 
fixed by the elite groups tend to reflect the salary levels of comparable groups in 
the more developed countries.”
  5. For example, see King (1987) and Tullao (1982).
  6. For example, see Stark, Helmenstein, and Prskawetz (1997, 1998); Mountford 
(1997); and Stark and Wang (2002).
  7. We assume that relative to the duration of the individual’s working life, the dura-
tion of the three stages is short.
  8. Schaafsma and Sweetman (2001) show that “working experience in the source 
country yields virtually no return in the host country.”
  9. Information on the employment status of migrants at home in developing coun-
tries prior to migration is scanty. Rudimentary studies suggest that on several 
occasions, nearly half of the migrants from India were unemployed prior to mi-
gration (Srivastava and Sasikumar 2003). Additional empirical work on the em-
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ployment status of individuals prior to their international migration would be of 
considerable interest.
 10. Although this assumption is not necessary, resorting to it highlights the notion 
that educated unemployment is caused by the prospect of migration.
 11. Note that in the current model, to facilitate our concentrating on essentials, unem-
ployment applies only to stage 2 of the individuals’ decision-making processes.
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